Executive Privilege (Chavez v. PEA, Senate v. Ermita, Neri v. Senate)

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002)

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers.  The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential.  The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondence, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial Power.  This is not the situation in the instant case.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.  Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations

Senate v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. …

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008) 

On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. x x x

The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, " that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."