Osmena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998

Osmena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998

Petitioners request a reexamination of the constitutionality of Sec. 11(b) of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, prohibiting the mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections.

REASONABLE REGULATION – AS TO TIME and SCOPE

The main purpose of §11(b) is regulatory.  Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising.  The restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope. 

What makes the regulation reasonable is precisely that it applies only to the election period.  Its enforcement outside the period would make it unreasonable.  More importantly, it should be noted that a “ban on mountain skiing” would be passive in nature.  It is like the statutory cap on campaign expenditures, but is so unlike the real nature of §11(b), as already explained.

CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION

In Adiong v. COMELEC this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on public property:

A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 

This test was actually formulated in United States v. O’Brien. It is an appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like §11(b), are content-neutral.  Unlike content-based restrictions, they are not imposed because of the content of the speech.   For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are tests demanding standards.  For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny.  These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity.  In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness. 

These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity.

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST, NOT AN APPROPRIATE TEST IN DETERMINING VALIDITY OF CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATIONS

Justice Panganiban’s dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that “media ads do not partake of the ‘real substantive evil’ that the state has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the people’s cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access to information.” The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems.  As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases.  For the criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty conspiracy or attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents.  To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed. 

The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech.  No such reasons underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the O’Brien test in this case, we find that §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.

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